

T H E
POLITICAL CONTEST;

Being a CONTINUATION of

JUNIUS'S LETTERS,

From the 8th of JULY last to the Present Time,

IN WHICH IS INCLUDED

Dr. B—'s POSTSCRIPT on Mr. WILKES'S
EXPULSION, and JUNIUS'S ANSWER.

A L S O

Sir WILLIAM DRAPER'S last Letter,

W I T H

J U N I U S ' s Reply.

P A R T II.

L O N D O N :

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POLITICAL GOVERNMENT

OF THE UNITED STATES

IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

BY JAMES M. SMITH

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOLUME I

NEW YORK



1850

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

T H E
POLITICAL CONTEST.



P A R T II.

L E T T E R VIII.

S I R,

 GREAT deal of useless argument might
 A have been saved, in the political contest,
 which has arisen from the expulsion of Mr.
 Wilkes, and the subsequent appointment of
Mr. Luttrell, if the question had been once stated with
precision, to the satisfaction of each party, and
clearly understood by them both. But in this, as in
almost every other dispute, it usually happens that
much time is lost in referring to a multitude of cases
and precedents, which prove nothing to the purpose,
or in maintaining propositions, which are either not
disputed, or, whether they be admitted or denied,
are entirely indifferent as to the matter in debate;
until at last the mind, perplexed and confounded with
the endless subtleties of controversy, loses sight of
the main question, and never arrives at truth. Both
parties in the dispute are apt enough to practise these
dishonest artifices. The man who is conscious of the
weakness of his cause, is interested in concealing it;
and on the other side it is not uncommon to see a good
cause mangled by advocates who do not know the real
strength of it.

B

I should

I should be glad to know, for instance, to what purpose in the present case so many precedents have been produced to prove, that the house of commons have a right to expell one of their own members; that it belongs to them to judge of the validity of elections; or that the law of parliament is part of the law of the land? After all these propositions are admitted, Mr. Luttrell's right to his seat will continue to be just as disputable as it was before. Not one of them is at present in agitation. Let it be admitted that the house of commons were authorized to expell Mr. Wilkes; that they are the proper court to judge of Elections; and that the law of parliament is binding upon the people; still it remains to be enquired whether the house, by their resolution in favour of Mr. Luttrell, have or have not truly declared that law. To facilitate this enquiry I would have the question cleared of all foreign or indifferent matter. The following state of it will probably be thought a fair one by both parties; and then I imagine there is no gentleman in this country who will not be capable of forming a judicious and true opinion upon it. I take the question to be strictly this: Whether or no it be the known established law of parliament, that the expulsion of a member of the house of commons of itself creates in him such an incapacity to be re-elected, that, at a subsequent election, any votes given to him are null and void, and that any other candidate, who, except the person expelled, has the greatest number of votes, ought to be the fitting member?

To prove that the affirmative is the law of Parliament, I apprehend it is not sufficient for the present house of commons to declare it to be so. We may shut our eyes indeed to the dangerous consequences of suffering one branch of the legislature to declare new laws, without argument or example, and it may perhaps be prudent enough to submit to authority; but a mere assertion will never convince, much less will it be thought reasonable to prove the right by the fact

fact itself. The ministry have not yet pretended to such a tyranny over our minds. To support the affirmative fairly, it will either be necessary to produce some statute in which that positive provision shall have been made, that specific disability clearly created, and the consequences of it declared; or if there be no such statute, the custom of parliament must then be referred to, and some case or cases, strictly in point, must be produced, with the decision of the court upon them; for I readily admit that the custom of parliament, once clearly proved, is equally binding with the common and statute law.

The consideration of what may be reasonable or unreasonable makes no part of this question. We are enquiring what the law is, not what it ought to be. Reason may be applied to shew the impropriety or expedience of a law, but we must have either statute or precedent to prove the existence of it. At the same time I do not mean to admit that the late resolution of the house of commons is defensible on general principles of reason, any more than in law. This is not the hinge on which the debate turns.

Supposing therefore that I have laid down an accurate state of the question, I will venture to affirm, 1st. That there is no statute existing by which that specific disability which we speak of is created. If there be, let it be produced. The argument will then be at an end.

2dly. That there is no precedent in all the proceedings of the house of commons, which comes entirely home to the present case, viz. 'where an expelled member has been returned again, and another candidate, with an inferior number of votes, has been declared the sitting member.' If there be such a precedent, let it be given to us plainly, and I am sure it will have more weight than all the cunning arguments which have been drawn from inferences and probabilities.

The ministry, in that laborious pamphlet which I presume contains the whole strength of the party, have

declared "that Mr. Walpole's was the first and only
" instance, in which the electors of any county or
" borough had returned a person expelled to serve in
" the same parliament." It is not possible to conceive
a case more exactly in point. Mr. Walpole was ex-
pelled, and having a majority of votes at the next
election, was returned again. The friends of Mr.
Taylor, a candidate set up by the ministry, petitioned
the house that he might be the sitting member. Thus
far the circumstances tally exactly, except that our
house of commons saved Mr. Luttrell the trouble of
petitioning. The point of law however was the same.
It came regularly before the house, and it was their
business to determine upon it. They did determine
it, for they declared Mr. Taylor *not duly elected*. If
it be said that they meant this resolution as matter of
favour and indulgence to the borough, which had re-
torted Mr. Walpole upon them, in order that the
Burgesses knowing what the law was, might correct
their error, I answer,

I. That it is a strange way of arguing to oppose a
supposition, which no man can prove, to a fact which
proves itself.

II. That if this were the intention of the house of
commons, it must have defeated itself. The Bur-
gesses of Lynn could never have known their error,
much less could they have corrected it by any in-
struction they received from the proceedings of the
house of commons. They might perhaps have fore-
seen this if they returned Mr. Walpole again, he
would again be rejected; but they never could infer,
from a resolution by which the candidate with the
fewest votes was declared *not duly elected*, that, at a
future election, and in similar circumstances, the
house of commons would reverse their resolution,
and receive the same candidate as duly elected, whom
they had before rejected.

This indeed would have been a most extraordinary
way of declaring the law of parliament, and what I
presume

presume no man, whose understanding is not at cross-purposes with itself, could possibly understand.

If in a case of this importance, I thought myself at liberty to argue from suppositions rather than from facts; I think the probability in this case is directly the reverse of what the ministry affirm; and that it is much more likely that the house of commons at that time would rather have strained a point in favour of Mr. Taylor, than that they would have violated the law of parliament, and robbed Mr. Taylor of a right legally vested in him, to gratify a refractory borough, which in defiance of them, had returned a person branded with the strongest mark of the displeasure of the house.

But really, Sir, this way of talking, for I cannot call it argument, is a mockery of the common understanding of the nation, too gross to be endured. Our dearest interests are at stake. An attempt has been made, not merely to rob a single county of its rights, but, by inevitable consequence, to alter the constitution of the house of commons. This fatal attempt has succeeded, and stands as a precedent recorded for ever. If the ministry are unable to defend their cause by fair argument founded on facts, let them spare us at least the mortification of being amused and deluded like children. I believe there is yet a spirit of resistance in this country, which will not submit to be oppressed; but I am sure there is a fund of good sense in this country which cannot be deceived.

J U N I U S.

Dr.

Dr. B---'s POSTSCRIPT†

IN ANSWER TO

JUNIUS'S LETTER.

SINCE these papers were sent to the press a writer in the public papers, who subscribes himself Junius, has made a feint of bringing this question to a short issue. Though the foregoing observations contain in my opinion at least, a full refutation of all that this writer has offered, I shall however, bestow a very few words upon him. It will indeed cost me very little trouble, to unravel and expose the sophistry of his argument.

“ I take the question, says he, to be strictly this:”
“ Whether or no it be the known established law of
“ parliament, that the expulsion of a member of the
“ house of commons of itself creates in him such an
“ incapacity to be re-elected, that, at a subsequent
“ election, any votes given to him are null and void;
“ and that any other candidate, who, except the
“ person expelled, has the greatest number of votes,
“ ought to be the sitting member.”

Waving for the present any objection I may have to this state of the question, I shall venture to meet our champion upon his own ground: and attempt to support the affirmative of it, in one of the two ways, by which he says it can be alone fairly supported. ‘ If there be no statute, says he, in which the specific disability is clearly created, &c. (and we acknowledge there is none) the custom of parliament must then be referred to, and some case or cases strictly in point, must be produced, with the decision of the court upon them.’ Now I assert, that this has been done.

† *Postscript* to his Pamphlet intituled “ An answer to the
“ Question stated.”

Mr.

(7)
Mr. Walpole's case is strictly in point, to prove, that expulsion creates absolute incapacity of being re-elected. This was the clear decision of the house upon it; and was a full declaration, that incapacity was the necessary consequence of expulsion. The law was as clearly and firmly fixed by this resolution, and is as binding in every subsequent case of expulsion, as if it had been declared by an express statute, 'that a member expelled by a resolution of the house of commons shall be deemed incapable of being re-elected.' Whatever doubt then there might have been of the law before Mr. Walpole's case, with respect to the full operation of a vote of expulsion, there can be none now. The decision of the house upon this case is strictly in point, to prove, that expulsion creates absolute incapacity in law of being re-elected.

But incapacity in law in this instance must have the same operation and effect with incapacity in law in every other instance. Now incapacity of being re-elected implies, in it's very terms, that any votes given to the incapable person, at a subsequent election, are null and void. This is it's necessary operation, or it has no operation at all. It is *vox et præterea nihil*. We can no more be called upon to prove this proposition, than we can to prove that a dead man is not alive, or that twice two are four. When the terms are understood, the proposition is self-evident.

Lastly, It is in all cases of election the known and established law of the land, grounded upon the clearest principles of reason and common sense, that if the votes given to one candidate are null and void, they cannot be opposed to the votes given to another candidate. They cannot affect the votes of such candidate at all. As they have, on the one hand, no positive quality to add or establish, so have they on the other hand, no negative one, to subtract or destroy. They are, in a word, a mere non-entity. Such was the determination of the house of commons in the Malden and Bedford elections; cases strictly in point

to the present Question, as far as they are meant to be in point. And to say, that they are not in point, in all circumstances; in those particularly which are independent of the proposition which they are quoted to prove, is to say no more than that Malden is not Middlesex, nor Serjeant Comyns Mr. Wilkes.

Let us see then how our proof stands. Expulsion creates incapacity; incapacity annihilates any votes given to the incapable person. The votes given to the qualified candidate stand upon their own bottom, firm and untouched, and can alone have effect. This, one would think, would be sufficient. But we are stopped short, and told, that none of our precedents come home to the present case; and are challenged to produce "a precedent in all the proceedings of the house of commons that does come home to it, viz. *where an expelled member has been returned again, and another candidate with an inferior number of votes, has been declared the sitting member.*"

Instead of a precedent, I will beg leave to put a case; which, I fancy, will be quite as decisive to the present point. Suppose another Sacheverel*, (and every party must have its Sacheverel) should, at some future election, take it into his head, to offer himself a candidate for the county of Middlesex. He is opposed by a candidate, whose coat is of a different colour; but however of a very good colour. The divine has an indisputable majority; nay, the poor layman is absolutely distanced. The sheriff, after having had his conscience well informed by the reverend casuist, returns him, as he supposes, duly elected. The whole House is in an uproar, at the apprehension of so strange an appearance amongst them. A motion however is at length made, that the person was incapable of being elected, that his election therefore is null and void, and that his competitor ought

* Why another *Sacheverel*, Doctor? *Tempora mutantur!*

to have been returned. No, says a great orator; First, shew me your law for this proceeding. "Either produce me a statute, in which the specific disability of a clergyman is created; or, produce me a precedent *where a clergyman has been returned, and another candidate, with an inferior number of votes, has been declared the sitting member.*" No such statute, no such precedent to be found. What answer then is to be given to this demand? The very same answer which I will give to that of Junius: That there is more than one precedent in the proceedings of the House,—‘where an incapable person has been returned, and another candidate, with an inferior number of votes, has been declared the sitting member; and that this is the known and established law, in all cases of incapacity, from whatever cause it may arise.’

I shall now therefore beg leave to make a slight amendment to Junius's state of the question; the affirmative of which will then stand thus:

‘It is the known and established law of parliament, that the expulsion of any member of the house of commons creates in him an incapacity of being re-elected; that any votes given to him at a subsequent election are, in consequence of such incapacity, null and void; and that any other candidate who, except the person rendered incapable, has the greatest number of votes, ought to be the sitting member.’

But our business is not yet quite finished. Mr. Walpole's case must have a re-hearing. "It is not possible, says this writer, to conceive a case more exactly in point. Mr. Walpole was expelled, and having a majority of votes at the next election, was returned again. The friends of Mr. Taylor, a candidate set up by the ministry, petitioned the house, that he might be the sitting member. Thus far the circumstances tally exactly, except that our house of commons saved Mr. Luttrell the trouble of petitioning. The point of law, however, was the same.

It came regularly before the house, and it was their business to determine upon it. They did determine it; for they declared Mr. Taylor *not duly elected.*"

Instead of examining the justness of this representation, I shall beg leave to oppose against it my own view of this case, in as plain a manner and as few words as I am able.

It was the known and established law of parliament, when the charge against Mr. Walpole came before the house of commons, that they had power to expel, to disable, and to render incapable for offences. In virtue of this power they expelled him. Had they, in the very vote of expulsion, adjudged him in terms, to be incapable of being re-elected, there must have been at once an end with him. But though the right of the house, both to expel, and adjudge incapable, was clear and indubitable, it does not appear to me, that the full operation and effect of a vote of expulsion singly was so. The law in this case had never been expressly declared. There had been no event to call up such a declaration. I trouble not myself with the grammatical meaning of the word expulsion. I regard only its legal meaning. This was not, as I think, precisely fixed. The house thought proper to fix it, and explicitly to declare the full consequences of their former vote, before they suffered these consequences to take effect. And in this proceeding they acted upon the most liberal and solid principles of equity, justice, and law. What then did the burgeses of Lynn collect from this second vote? Their subsequent conduct will tell us; it will with certainty tell us, that they considered it as decisive against Mr. Walpole; it will also, with equal certainty, tell us, that, upon supposition that the law of election stood then, as it does now, and that they knew it to stand thus, they inferred, "that at a future election, and in case of a similar return, the house would receive the same candidate, as duly elected,

electd, whom they had before rejectd. They could infer nothing but this.

It is needless to repeat the circumstance of dissimilarity in the present case. It will be sufficient to observe, that as the law of parliament, upon which the house of commons grounded every step of their proceedings, was clear beyond the reach of doubt, so neither could the Freeholders of Middlesex be at a loss to foresee what must be the inevitable consequence of their proceeding in opposition to it. For upon every return of Mr. Wilkes, the house made enquiry, whether any votes were given to any other candidate.

But I could venture, for the experiment's sake, even to give this writer the utmost he asks; to allow the most perfect similarity throughout in these two cases; to allow, that the law of expulsion was quite as clear to the burgeses of Lynn, as to the freeholders of Middlesex. It will, I am confident, avail his cause but little. It will only prove, that the law of election at that time was different from the present law. It will prove, that, in all cases of an incapable candidate returned, the law then was, that the whole election should be void. But now we know that this is not law. The cases of Malden and Bedford were, as has been seen, determined upon other and more just principles. And these determinations are, I imagine, admitted on all sides, to be law.

- I would willingly draw a veil over the remaining part of this paper*. It is astonishing, it is painful, to see men of parts and ability, giving into the most unworthy artifices, and descending so much below their true line of character. But if they are not the dupes of their own sophistry, (which is hardly to be conceived) let them consider that they are something much worse.

* It is high time he should, having said but little to the purpose to strengthen his argument.

The dearest interests of this country are its laws and its constitution. Against every attack upon these, there will, I hope, be always found amongst us the firmest *spirit of resistance*; superior to the united efforts of faction and ambition. For ambition, though it does not always take the lead of faction, will be sure in the end to make the most fatal advantage of it, and draw it to its own purposes. But, I trust, our day of trial is yet far off; and that there is *a fund of good sense in this country which cannot long be deceived*, by the arts either of false reasoning or false patriotism.



LET-

LETTER IX.

S I R,

THE gentleman, who has published an answer to Sir William Meredith's pamphlet, having honoured me with a postscript of six quarto pages, which he moderately calls, bestowing *very* few words upon me, I cannot, in common politeness, refuse him a reply. The form and magnitude of a quarto imposes upon the mind, and men, who are unequal to the labour of discussing an intricate argument, or wish to avoid it, are willing enough to suppose, that much has been proved, because much has been said. Mine, I confess, are humble labours. I do not presume to instruct the learned, but simply to inform the body of the people; and I prefer that channel of conveyance, which is likely to spread farthest among them. The advocates of the ministry seem to me to write for fame, and to flatter themselves, that the size of their works will make them immortal. They pile up reluctant quarto upon solid folio, as if their labours, because they are gigantic, could contend with truth and heaven.

The writer of the volume in question meets me upon my own ground. He acknowledges there is no statute, by which the specific disability we speak of is created, but he affirms that the custom of parliament has been referred to, and that a case strictly in point has been produced, with the decision of the court upon it.—I thank him for coming so fairly to the point. He asserts, that the case of Mr. Walpole, is strictly in point to prove that expulsion creates an absolute incapacity of being re-elected; and for this purpose he refers generally to the first vote of the house upon that occasion,

occasion, without venturing to recite the vote itself. The unfair, disingenuous artifice of adopting that part of a precedent, which seems to suit his purpose, and omitting the remainder, deserves some pity, but cannot excite my resentment. He takes advantage eagerly of the first resolution, by which Mr. Walpole's incapacity is declared; and as to the two following, by which the candidate with the fewest votes was declared "not duly elected," and the election itself vacated; I dare say, he would be well satisfied, if they were for ever blotted out of the journals of the house of commons. In fair argument, no part of a precedent should be admitted, unless the whole of it be given to us together. The author has divided his precedent, for he knew that, taken together, it produced a consequence directly the reverse of that, which he endeavours to draw from a vote of expulsion. But what will this honest person say, if I take him at his word, and demonstrate to him, that the house of commons never meant to found Mr. Walpole's incapacity upon his expulsion only? What subterfuge will then remain?

Let it be remembered that we are speaking of the intention of men, who lived more than half a century ago, and that such intention can only be collected from their words and actions, as they are delivered to us upon record. To prove their designs by a supposition of what they would have done, opposed to what they actually did, is mere trifling and impertinence. The vote, by which Mr. Walpole's incapacity was declared, is thus expressed, "That Robert Walpole, Esq; having been this session of parliament committed a prisoner to the Tower, and expelled this house for a breach of trust in the execution of his office, and notorious corruption when a secretary at war, was and is incapable of being elected a member to serve in this present parliament *." Now, sir,

* It is well worth remarking, that the compiler of a certain quarto, called *The case of the last election for the county of Mid-*

to my understanding, no proposition of this kind can be more evident, than that the house of commons, by this very vote, themselves understood, and meant to declare, that Mr. Walpole's incapacity arose from the crimes he had committed, not from the punishment the house annexed to them. The high breach of trust, the notorious corruption are stated in the strongest terms. They do not tell us he was incapable, because he was expelled, but because he had been guilty of such offences, as justly rendered him unworthy of a seat in parliament. If they had intended to fix the disability upon his expulsion alone, the mention of his crimes in the same vote, would have been highly improper. It could only perplex the minds of the electors, who, if they collected any thing from so confused a declaration of the law of parliament, must have concluded that their representative had been declared incapable because he was highly guilty, not because he had been punished. But even admitting them to have understood it in the other sense, they must then, from the very terms of the vote, have united the idea of his being sent to the Tower with that of his expulsion, and considered his incapacity as the joint effect of both.

I do mean to give an opinion upon the justice of the proceedings of the house of commons, with regard to Mr. Walpole; but certainly, if I admitted their censure to be well founded, I could no way avoid agreeing with them in the consequence they drew from it. I could never have a doubt, in law or reason, that a man, convicted of a high breach of trust, and of a notorious corruption, in the execution of a public

desex considered, has the impudence to recite this very vote, in the following terms, vide page 2. "Resolved, that Robert Walpole, Esq; having been that session of parliament expelled the house, was and is incapable of being elected a member to serve in the present parliament." There cannot be a stronger positive proof of the treachery of the compiler, nor a stronger presumptive proof that he was convinced that the vote, if truly recited, would overturn his whole argument.

office,

once, was and ought to be incapable of sitting in the same parliament. Far from attempting to invalidate that vote, I should have wished that the incapacity declared by it could legally have been continued for ever.

Now, Sir, observe how forcibly the argument returns. The house of commons, upon the face of their proceedings, had the strongest motives to declare Mr. Walpole incapable of being re-elected. They thought such a man unworthy to sit among them. To that point they proceeded no further; for they respected the rights of the people, while they asserted their own. They did not infer, from Mr. Walpole's incapacity, that his opponent was duly elected; on the contrary they declared Mr. Taylor "Not duly elected," and the election itself void.

Such, however, is the precedent, which my honest friend assures us is strictly in point to prove, that expulsion of itself creates an incapacity of being elected. If it had been so the present house of commons should at least have followed strictly the example before them, and should have stated to us, in the same vote, the crimes for which they expelled Mr. Wilkes; whereas they resolve simply, that, "having been expelled, he was and is incapable." In this proceeding, I am authorised to affirm, they have neither statute nor custom, nor reason, nor one single precedent to support them. On the other side there is indeed a precedent so strongly in point, that all the enchanted castles of ministerial magic fall before it. In the year 1698, (a period which the rankest tory dare not except against) Mr. Wollaston was expelled, re-elected, and admitted to take his seat in the same parliament. The ministry have precluded themselves from all objections drawn from the cause of his expulsion, for they affirm absolutely that expulsion of itself creates the disability. Now, Sir, let sophistry evade, let falsehood assert, and impudence deny; — here stands the precedent, a land-mark to direct us through a troubled sea of controversy, conspicuous and unremoved.

I have

I have dwelt the longer upon the discussion of this point, because in *my* opinion it comprehends the whole question. The rest is unworthy of notice. We are enquiring whether incapacity be or be not created by expulsion. In the cases of Bedford and Malden, the incapacity of the persons returned was matter of public notoriety, for it was created by act of Parliament. But really, sir, my honest friend's suppositions are as unfavourable to him as his facts. He well knows that the clergy, besides that they are represented in common with their fellow subjects, have also a separate parliament of their own;—that their incapacity to sit in the house of commons has been confirmed by repeated decisions of the house, and that the law of parliament, declared by those decisions, has been for above two centuries notorious and undisputed. The author is certainly at liberty to fancy cases, and make whatever comparisons he thinks proper; his suppositions still continue at a distance from fact, as his wild discourses are from solid argument.

The conclusion of his book is candid to an extreme. He offers to grant me all I desire. He thinks he may safely admit that the case of Mr. Walpole makes directly against him, for it seems he has one grand solution *in petto* for all Difficulties. *If, says he, I were to allow all this, it will only prove, that the law of election was different, in queen Ann's time, from what it is at present.*

This indeed is more than I expected. The principle, I know, has been maintained in fact, but I never expected to see it so formally declared. What can he mean? does he assume this language to satisfy the doubts of the people, or does he mean to rouse their indignation; are the ministry daring enough to affirm that the house of commons have a right to make and unmake the law of parliament at their pleasure?—Does the law of parliament, which we are so often told is the law of the land;—does the common right of every subject of the realm depend upon an ar-

bitrary, capricious vote of one branch of the legislature;—The voice of truth and reason must be silent.

The ministry tell us plainly that this is no longer a question of right, but of power and force alone. What was law yesterday is not law to day: and now it seems we have no better rule to live by than the temporary discretion and fluctuating integrity of the house of commons.

Professions of Patriotism are become stale and ridiculous. For my own part, I claim no merit from endeavouring to do a service to my fellow subjects. I have done it to the best of my understanding; and without looking for the approbation of other men, my conscience is satisfied. What remains to be done concerns the collective body of the people. They are now to determine for themselves whether they will firmly and constitutionally assert their rights, or make an humble slavish surrender of them at the feet of the ministry. To a generous mind there cannot be a doubt. We owe it to our ancestors to preserve entire those rights, which they have delivered to our care; we owe it to our posterity, not to suffer their dearest inheritance to be destroyed. But if it were possible for us to be insensible of these sacred claims, there is yet an obligation binding upon ourselves, from which nothing can acquit us,—a personal interest, which we cannot surrender. To alienate even our own rights, would be a crime as much more enormous than suicide, as a life of civil society and freedom is superior to a bare existence; and if life be the bounty of heaven, we scornfully reject the noblest part of the gift, if we consent to surrender that certain rule of living, without which the condition of human nature is not only miserable, but contemptible.

J U N I U S.

L E T-



LETTER X.

TO DR. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
SOLICITOR GENERAL to her MAJESTY.

S I R,

I SHALL make you no apology for considering a certain pamphlet, in which your late conduct is defended, as written by yourself. The personal interest, the personal resentments, and above all, that wounded spirit, unaccustomed to reproach, and I hope not frequently conscious of deserving it, are signals, which betray the author to us as plainly as if your name were in the title page. You appeal to the public in defence of your reputation. We hold it, Sir, that an injury offered to an individual is interesting to society. On this principle the people of England made common cause with Mr. Wilkes. On this principle, if *you* are injured, they will join in your resentment. I shall not follow you through the insipid form of a third person, but address myself to you directly.

You seem to think the channel of a pamphlet more respectable and better suited to the dignity of your cause, than that of a news-paper. Be it so. Yet if news-papers are scurrilous, you must confess they are impartial. They give us, without any apparent preference, the wit and argument of the ministry, as well as the abusive dulness of the opposition. The scales are equally poised. It is not the printer's fault if the greater weight inclines the balance.

Your pamphlet then is divided into an attack upon Mr. Grenville's character, and a defence of your own. It would have been more consistent perhaps with your professed intentions, to have confined yourself to the last. But anger has some claim to indulgence, and

railing is usually a relief to the mind. I hope you have found benefit from the experiment. It is not my design to enter into a formal vindication of Mr. Grenville upon his own principles. I have neither the honour of being personally known to him, nor do I pretend to be completely master of all the facts. I need not run the risque of doing an injustice to his opinions or to his conduct, when your pamphlet alone carries, upon the face of it, a full vindication of both.

Your first reflection is that Mr. Grenville was of all men the person, who should not have complained of inconsistency with regard to Mr. Wilkes. This, Sir, is either an unmeaning sneer, a peevish expression of resentment, or, if it means any thing, you plainly beg the question; for whether his parliamentary conduct with regard to Mr. Wilkes has or has not been inconsistent, remains yet to be proved. But it seems he received upon the spot a sufficient chastisement for exercising *so unfairly* his talent of misrepresentation. You are a lawyer, Sir, and know better than I do, upon what particular occasions a talent for misrepresentation may be *fairly* exerted; but to punish a man a second time, when he has been once sufficiently chastised, is rather too severe. It is not in the laws of England; it is not in your own commentaries, nor is it yet I believe in the new law you have revealed to the house of commons. I hope this doctrine has no existence but in your own heart. After all, Sir, if you had consulted that sober discretion, which you seem to oppose with triumph to the honest jollity of a tavern, it might have occurred to you that, although you could have succeeded in fixing a charge of inconsistency upon Mr. Grenville, it would not have tended in any shape to exculpate yourself.

Your next insinuation, that Sir William Meredith, had hastily adopted the false glosses of his new Ally is of the same sort with the first. It conveys a sneer

as little worthy of the gravity of your character, as it is useless to your defence. It is of little moment to the public to enquire by whom the charge was conceived, or by whom it was adopted. The only question we ask is, whether or not it be true. The remainder of your reflections upon Mr. Grenville's conduct destroy themselves. He could not possibly come prepared to traduce your integrity to the house. He could not foresee that you would even speak upon the question, much less could he foresee that you would maintain a direct contradiction of that doctrine, which you had solemnly, disinterestedly, and upon soberest reflection delivered to the public. He came armed indeed with what he thought a respectable authority, to support what he was convinced was the cause of truth, and I doubt not he intended to give you, in the course of the debate, an honourable and public testimony of his esteem. Thinking highly of his abilities, I cannot however allow him the gift of divination. As to what you are pleased to call a plan coolly formed to impose upon the house of commons, and his producing it without provocation at midnight, I consider it as the language of pique and invective, therefore unworthy of regard. But Sir, I am sensible I have followed your example too long, and wandered from the point.

The quotation from your commentaries is matter of record. It can neither be *altered* by your friends, nor misrepresented by your enemies, and I am willing to take your own word for what you said in the house of commons. If there be a real difference between what you have written and what you have spoken, you confess that your book ought to be the standard. Now, Sir, if words mean any thing, I apprehend that when a long enumeration of disqualifications (whether by statute or the custom of parliament) concludes with these general comprehensive words, 'but subject to these restrictions and disqualifications, every subject of the realm is eligible of common right,'

a reader

a reader of a plain understanding must of course rest satisfied that no species of disqualifications whatsoever had been omitted. The known character of the author, and the apparent accuracy with which the whole work is compiled, would confirm him in his opinion; nor could he possibly form any other judgment, without looking upon your commentaries in the same light in which you consider those penal laws, which though not repealed are fallen into disuse, and are now in effect **A SNARE TO THE UNWARY.**

You tell us indeed that it was not part of your plan to specify any temporary incapacity, and that you could not, without a spirit of prophecy, have specified the disability of a private individual, subsequent to the period at which you wrote. What your plan was I know not; but what it should have been, in order to compleat the work you have given us, is by no means difficult to determine. The incapacity, which you call temporary, may continue seven years; and though you might not have foreseen the particular case of Mr. Wilkes, you might and should have foreseen the possibility of *such* a case, and told us how far the house of commons were authorized to proceed in it by the law and custom of parliament. The freeholders of Middlesex would then have known what they had to trust to, and would never have returned Mr. Wilkes, when colonel Luttrell was a candidate against him. They would have chose some indifferent person rather than submit to be represented by the object of their contempt and detestation.

Your attempt to distinguish between disabilities, which affect whole classes of men, and those which affect individuals only, is really unworthy of your understanding. Your commentaries had taught me that, although the instance, in which a penal law is exerted, be particular, the laws themselves are general. They are made for the benefit and instruction of the public, though the penalty falls only upon an individual. You cannot but know, Sir, that what
was

was Mr. Wilkes's case yesterday may be your's or mine to morrow, and that consequently the common right of every subject of the realm is invaded by it. Professing therefore to treat of the constitution of the house of commons, and of the laws and customs relative to that constitution, you certainly were guilty of a most unpardonable omission, in taking no notice of a right and privilege of the house, more extraordinary and more arbitrary than all the others they possess put together. If the expulsion of a member, not under any other legal disability, of itself creates in him an incapacity to be re-elected, I see a ready way marked out, by which the majority may at any time remove the honestest and ablest men who happen to be in opposition to them. To say that they *will not* make this extravagant use of their power, would be a language unfit for a man so learned in the laws as you are. By your doctrine, Sir, they *have* the power, and laws you know are intended to guard against what men *may* do, not to trust to what they *will* do.

Upon the whole, Sir, the charge against you is of a plain, simple nature: It appears even upon the face of your own pamphlet. On the contrary, your justification of yourself is full of subtlety and refinement, and in some places not very intelligible. If I were personally your enemy, I should dwell, with a malignant pleasure, upon those great and useful qualifications, which you certainly possess, and by which you once acquired, though they could not preserve to you the respect and esteem of your country, I should enumerate the honours you have lost, and the virtues you have disgraced: But having no private resentments to gratify, I think it sufficient to have given my opinion of your public conduct, leaving the punishment it deserves to your closet and to yourself.

JUNIUS.

LETTER XI.

S I R,

I Must beg of you to print a few lines, in explanation of some passages in my last letter, which I see have been misunderstood.

1. When I said, that the house of commons never meant to found Mr Walpole's incapacity on his expulsion *only*, I meant no more than to deny the general proposition, that expulsion *alone* creates the incapacity. If there be any thing ambiguous in the expression, I beg leave to explain it by saying, that, in my opinion, expulsion neither creates, nor in any part contributes to create the incapacity in question.

2. I carefully avoided entering into the merits of Mr. Walpole's case. I did not enquire, whether the house of commons acted justly, or whether they truly declared the law of parliament. My remarks went only to their apparent meaning and intention, as it stands declared in their own resolution.

3. I never meant to affirm, that a commitment to the Tower created a disqualification. On the contrary, I considered that idea as an absurdity into which the ministry must inevitably fall, if they reasoned right upon their own principles.

The case of Mr. Wollaston speaks for itself. The ministry assert that expulsion alone creates an absolute, complete incapacity to be re-elected to sit in the same parliament. This proposition they have uniformly maintained, without any condition or modification whatsoever. Mr. Wollaston was expelled, re-elected, and admitted to take his seat in the same parliament.—I leave it to the public to determine, whether this be a plain matter of fact, or mere nonsense and declamation.

J U N I U S.

L E T -



LETTER XI.

*To his Grace the Duke of *****.*

My LORD,

YOU are so little accustomed to receive any marks of respect or esteem from the public, that if, in the following lines, a compliment or expression of applause should escape me, I fear you would consider it as a mockery of your established character, and perhaps an insult to your understanding. You have nice feelings, my Lord, if we may judge from your resentments. Cautious therefore of giving offence, where you have so little deserved it, I shall leave the illustration of your virtues to other hands. Your friends have a privilege to play upon the easiness of your temper, or possibly they are better acquainted with your good qualities than I am. You have done good by stealth. The rest is upon record. You have still left ample room for speculation, when panegyric is exhausted.

You are indeed a very considerable man. The highest rank;—a splendid fortune; and a name, glorious till it was yours, were sufficient to have supported you with meaner abilities than I think you possess. From the first, you derived a constitutional claim to respect; from the second, a natural extensive authority;—the last created a partial expectation of hereditary virtues. The use you have made of these uncommon advantages might have been more honourable to yourself, but could not be more instructive to mankind. We may trace it in the veneration of your country, the choice of your friends,

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and in the accomplishment of every sanguine hope, which the public might have conceived from the illustrious name of R——l.

The eminence of your station gave you a commanding prospect of your duty. The road, which led to honour, was open to your view. You could not lose it by mistake, and you had no temptation to depart from it by design. Compare the natural dignity and importance of the richest Peer of England;—the noble independence, which he might have maintained in parliament; and the real interest and respect, which he might have acquired, not only in parliament, but through the whole kingdom; compare these glorious distinctions with the ambition of holding a share in government, the emoluments of a place, the sale of a borough, or the purchase of a corporation; and though you may not regret the virtues, which create respect, you may see, with anguish, how much real importance and authority you have lost. Consider the character of an independent virtuous Duke of ———; imagine what he might be in this country, then reflect one moment upon what you are. If it be possible for me to withdraw my attention from the fact, I will tell you in theory what such a man might be.

Conscious of his own weight and importance, his conduct in parliament would be directed by nothing but the constitutional duty of a peer. He would consider himself as a guardian of the laws. Willing to support the just measures of government, but determined to observe the conduct of the minister with suspicion, he would oppose the violence of faction with as much firmness, as the encroachments of prerogative. He would be as little capable of bargaining with the minister for places for himself, or his dependants, as of descending to mix himself in the intrigues of opposition. Whenever an important question called for his opinion in parliament, he would be heard, by the most profligate minister, with
deference

deference and respect. His authority would either sanctify or disgrace the measures of government.— The people would look up to him as to their protector, and a virtuous prince would have one honest man in his dominions, in whose integrity and judgment he might safely confide. If it should be the will of providence to afflict him with a domestic misfortune, he would submit to the stroke, with feeling, but not without dignity. He would consider the people as his children, and receive a generous heart-felt consolation, in the sympathising tears, and blessings of his country.

Your Grace may probably discover something more intelligible in the negative part of this illustrious character. The man I have described would never prostitute his dignity in parliament by an indecent violence either in opposing or defending a minister. He would not at one moment rancorously persecute, at another basely cringe to the favourite of his S——n. After outraging the royal dignity with peremptory conditions, little short of menace and hostility, he would never descend to the humility of soliciting an interview with the Favourite, and of offering to recover, at any price, the honour of his friendship. Though deceived perhaps in his youth, he would not, through the course of a long life, have invariably chosen his friends from among the most profligate of mankind. His own honour would have forbidden him from mixing his private pleasures or conversation with jockeys, gamesters, blasphemers, gladiators, or buffoons. He would then have never felt, much less would he have submitted to the humiliating dishonest necessity, of engaging in the interests and intrigues of his dependants, of supplying their vices, or relieving their beggary, at the expence of his country. He would not have betrayed such ignorance, or such contempt of the constitution, as openly to avow, in a court of justice, the purchase and sale of a borough. He would not

have thought it consistent with his rank in the state, or even with his personal importance, to be the little tyrant of a little corporation. He would never have been insulted with virtues, which he had laboured to extinguish, nor suffered the disgrace of a mortifying defeat, which has made him ridiculous and contemptible, even to the few by whom he was not detested.—I reverence the afflictions of a good man—his sorrows are sacred. But how can we take part in the distresses of a man, whom we can neither love nor esteem; or feel for a calamity, of which he himself is insensible. Where was the father's heart, when he could look for, or find an immediate consolation for the loss of an only son, in consultations and bargains for a place at court, and even in the misery of balloting at the India House!

Admitting then that you have mistaken or deserted those honourable principles, which ought to have directed your conduct; admitting that you have as little claim to private affection as to public esteem, let us see with what abilities, with what degree of judgment you have carried your own system into execution. A great man, in the success and even in the magnitude of his crimes, finds a rescue from contempt. Your Grace is every way unfortunate. Yet I will not look back to those ridiculous scenes, by which, in your earlier days, you thought it an honour to be distinguished; the recorded stripes, the public infamy, your own sufferings, or Mr. Rigby's fortitude. These events undoubtedly left an impression, though not upon your mind. To such a mind, it may perhaps be a pleasure to reflect, that there is hardly a corner of any of his Majesty's kingdoms, except France, in which, at one time or other, your valuable life has not been in danger. Amiable man! we see and acknowledge the protection of providence, by which you have so often escaped the personal detestation of your fellow subjects, and
are

are still reserved for the public justice of your country.

Your history begins to be important at that auspicious period, at which you were deputed to represent the Earl of Bute, at the court of Versailles. It was an honourable office, and executed with the same spirit with which it was accepted. Your patrons wanted an ambassador, who would submit to make concessions, without daring to insist upon any honourable condition for his Sovereign. Their business required a man, who had as little feeling for his own dignity, as for the welfare of his country; and they found him in the first rank of the nobility. Belleisle, Goree, Guadaloupe, St. Lucia, Martinique, the Fishery, and the Havanna, are glorious monuments of your Grace's talents for negotiation. My Lord, we are too well acquainted with your pecuniary character, to think it possible that so many public sacrifices should have been made, without some private compensations. Your conduct carries with it an interior evidence, beyond all the legal proofs of a court of justice. Even the callous pride of Lord Egremont was alarmed. He saw and felt his own dishonour in corresponding with you; and there certainly was a moment, at which he meant to have resisted, had not a fatal lethargy prevailed over his faculties, and carried all sense and memory away with it.

I will not pretend to specify the secret terms on which you were invited to support an administration which Lord Bute pretended to leave in full possession of their ministerial authority, and perfectly masters of themselves. He was not of a temper to relinquish power, though he retired from employment. Stipulations were certainly made between your Grace and him, and certainly violated. After two years submission, you thought you had collected a strength sufficient to controul his influence, and that it was your turn to be a tyrant, because you had been
a slave.

I have. When you found yourself mistaken in your opinion of your gracious Master's firmness, disappointment got the better of all your humble discretion, and carried you to an excess of outrage to his person, as distant from true spirit, as from all decency and respect. After robbing him of the rights of a King, you would not permit him to preserve the honour of a Gentleman. It was then Lord Weymouth was nominated to Ireland, and dispatched (we well remember with what indecent hurry) to plunder the treasury of the first fruits of an employment which you well knew he was never to execute.

This sudden declaration of war against the Favourite, might have given you a momentary merit with the public, if it had either been adopted upon principle, or maintained with resolution. Without looking back to all your former servility, we need only observe your subsequent conduct, to see upon what motives you acted. Apparently united with Mr. Grenville, you waited until Lord Rockingham's feeble administration should dissolve in its own weakness.—The moment their dismissal was suspected, the moment you perceived that another system was adopted in the closet; you thought it no disgrace to return to your former dependance, and solicit once more the friendship of Lord Bute. You begged an interview, at which he had spirit enough to treat you with contempt.

It would now be of little use to point out, by what a train of weak, injudicious measures, it became necessary, or was thought so, to call you back to a share in the administration. The Friends, whom you did not in the least instance desert, were not of a character to add strength or credit to Government; and at that time your alliance with the Duke of Grafton was, I presume, hardly foreseen. We must look for other stipulations, to account for that sudden resolution of the closet, by which three of your dependants (whose characters, I think, cannot be less re-
spected

spected than they are) were advanced to offices, through which you might again controul the minister, and probably engross the whole direction of affairs.

The possession of absolute power is now once more within your reach. The measures you have taken to obtain and confirm it, are too gross to escape the eyes of a discerning judicious prince. His palace is besieged; the lines of circumvallation are drawing round him; and unless he finds a resource in his own activity, or in the attachment of the real friends of his family, the best of princes must submit to the confinement of a state prisoner, until your Grace's death, or some less fortunate event, shall raise the siege. For the present, you may safely resume that stile of insult and menace, which even a private gentleman cannot submit to hear without being contemptible. Mr. Mackenzie's history is not yet forgotten, and you may find precedents enough of the mode in which an imperious subject may signify his pleasure to his sovereign. Where will this gracious monarch look for assistance, when the wretched G——n could forget his obligations to his master, and desert him for a hollow alliance with *such* a man as the Duke of ———.

Let us consider you, then, as arrived at the summit of worldly greatness: let us suppose, that all your plans of avarice and ambition are accomplished, and your most sanguine wishes gratified in the fear, as well as the hatred of the people: Can Age itself forget that you are now in the last act of life? Can grey hairs make folly venerable? and is there no period to be reserved for meditation and retirement? For shame! my Lord: Let it not be recorded of you, that the latest moments of your life were dedicated to the same unworthy pursuits, the same busy agitations, in which your youth and manhood were exhausted. Consider that, although you cannot disgrace your former life, you are violating the
character

character of age, and exposing the impotent imbecility, after you have lost the vigour of the passions.


Your friends will ask, perhaps, Whither shall this unhappy old man retire? Can he remain in the metropolis, where his life has been so often threatened, and his palace so often attacked? If he returns to W——n, scorn and mockery await him. He must create a solitude round his estate, if he would avoid the face of reproach and derision. At Plymouth, his destruction would be more than probable; at Exeter, inevitable. No honest Englishman will ever forget his attachment, nor any honest Scotchman forgive his treachery to Lord Bute. At every town he enters, he must change his liveries and his name. Which ever way he flies, the *Hue and Cry* of the country pursues him.

In another kingdom indeed, the blessings of his administration have been more sensibly felt;—his virtues better understood;—or at worst, they will not, for him alone, forget their hospitality.—As well might VERRES have returned to Sicily. You have twice escaped, my Lord; beware of a third experiment. The indignation of a whole people, plundered, insulted, and oppressed as they have been, will not always be disappointed.

It is in vain therefore to shift the scene. You can no more fly from your enemies than from yourself. Persecuted abroad, you look into your own heart for consolation, and find nothing but reproaches and despair. But, my Lord, you may quit the field of business, though not the field of danger; and though you cannot be safe, you may cease to be ridiculous. I fear you have listened too long to the advice of those pernicious friends, with whose interests you have sordidly united your own, and for whom you have sacrificed every thing that ought to be dear to a man of honour. They are still base enough to encourage the follies of your age, as they

they once did the vices of your youth. As little acquainted with the rules of decorum, as with the laws of morality, they will not suffer you to profit by experience, nor even to consult the propriety of a bad character. Even now they tell you, that life is no more than a dramatic scene, in which the hero should preserve his consistency to the last, and that as you lived without virtue, you should die without repentance.

J U N I U S.



L E T T E R X I I .

T o J U N I U S.

S I R,

HAVING accidentally seen a *republication* of your letters, wherein you have been pleased to *assert*, that I had *sold* the companions of my success; I am again obliged to declare the said assertion to be a most *infamous* and *malicious false-hood*; and I *again* call upon you to stand forth, avow yourself, and *prove* the charge. If you can make it out to the satisfaction of any one man in the kingdom, I will be content to be thought the worst man in it; if you do not, what must the nation think of you? *Party* has nothing to do in this affair: You have made a personal attack upon my honour, defamed me by a most vile calumny, which might possibly have sunk into oblivion, had not such uncommon pains been taken to renew and perpetuate this scandal, chiefly because it has been told in good language: For I give you full credit for your elegant diction, well turned periods, and attic wit; but wit is oftentimes false, though it may appear brilliant; which is exactly the case of your *whole performance*. But, Sir, I am obliged in the most *serious* manner to

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
accuse

accuse you of being guilty of *falsities*. You have said the thing that is *not*. To support your story, you have recourse to the following *irresistible* argument: ' You *sold* the companions of your victory, because when the sixteenth regiment was given to *you*, you was *silent*.' The conclusion is inevitable. I believe that such *deep* and *acute reasoning* could only come from such an extraordinary writer as *Junius*. But unfortunately for you, the *premises* as well as the *conclusion* are absolutely *false*. Many applications have been made to the ministry on the subject of the Manilla Ransom *since* the time of my being colonel of that regiment. As I have for some years quitted London, I was obliged to have recourse to the honourable colonel Monson and Sir Samuel Cornish to *negotiate* for me: In the last autumn I personally delivered a memorial to the earl of Shelburne at his seat in Wiltshire. As you have told us of your importance, that you are a person of *rank* and *fortune*, and above a *common* bribe, you may in all probability be not *unknown* to his lordship, who can satisfy you of the truth of what I say. But I shall now take the liberty, Sir, to seize your battery, and turn it against yourself. If your puerile and tinsel logic could carry the least weight or conviction with it, how must *you* stand affected by the *inevitable conclusion*, as you are pleased to term it? According to *Junius*, *Silence is Guilt*. In many of the public papers, you have been called in the most direct and offensive terms a *liar* and a *coward*. When did you reply to these foul accusations? You have been quite *silent*; quite chop-fallen: Therefore, *because* you was *silent*, the nation has a right to pronounce you to be both a liar and a coward from your own argument: But, Sir, I will give you fair play; will afford you an opportunity to wipe off the first appellation; by desiring the proofs of your charge against me. Produce them! To wipe off the last, produce *yourself*. People cannot bear any longer your *lion's skin*, and the despicable *imposture* of the *old Roman*
name

name which you have *affected*. For the future assume the name of some *modern* bravo and dark assassin: Let your appellation have some affinity to your practice. But if I must *perish*, *Junius*, let me *perish* in the face of day; be for *once* a generous and open enemy. I allow that gothic *appeals* to cold iron are no better proofs of a man's honesty and veracity than hot iron and burning ploughshares are of *female chastity*: But a soldier's honour is as delicate as a woman's; it must not be suspected; you have dared to throw more than a suspicion upon mine: You cannot but know the consequences, which even the meekness of christianity would pardon me for, after the injury you have done me.

WILLIAM DRAPER.





L E T T E R XIII.

Hæret lateri letthalis arundo.

To Sir W I L L I A M D R A P E R.
KNIGHT of the BATH.

S I R,

AFTER so long an interval, I did not expect to see the debate revived between us. My answer to your last letter shall be short; for I write to you with reluctance, and I hope we shall now conclude our correspondence for ever.

Had you been originally and without provocation attacked by an anonymous writer, you would have some right to demand his name. But in this case you are a volunteer. You engaged in it with the unpremeditated Gallantry of a soldier. You were content to set your name in opposition to a man, who would probably continue in concealment. You understood the terms, upon which we were to correspond, and gave at least a tacit assent to them. After voluntarily attacking me under the character of Junius, what possible right have you to know me under any other? Will you forgive me if I insinuate to you, that you foresaw some honour in the apparent spirit of coming forward in person, and that you were not quite indifferent to the display of your literary qualifications?

You cannot but know that the republication of my letters was no more than a catchpenny* contrivance of a Printer, in which it was impossible I should be concerned, and for which I am no way answerable.

* The editor's motive, for this republication, is otherwise expressed in his preface to the *first part* of these letters.

At the same time I wish you to understand, that if I do not take the trouble of reprinting these papers, it is not from any fear of giving offence to Sir William Draper.

Your remarks upon a signature, adopted merely for distinction, are unworthy of notice; but when you tell me I have submitted to be called a liar and a coward, I must ask you in my turn, whether you seriously think it any way incumbent upon me to take notice of the silly invectives of every simpleton, who writes in a news-paper; and what opinion you would have conceived of my discretion, if I had suffered myself to be the dupe of so shallow an artifice?

Your appeal to the sword, though consistent enough with your late profession, will neither prove your innocence nor clear you from suspicion.—Your complaints with regard to the Manilla ransom were, for a considerable time, a distress to government. You were appointed (greatly out of your turn) to the command of a regiment, and *during that administration* we heard no more of Sir William Draper. The facts, of which I speak, may indeed be variously accounted for, but they are too notorious to be denied; and I think you might have learnt at the university, that a false conclusion is an error in argument, not a breach of veracity. Your solicitations, I doubt not, were renewed under *another* administration. Admitting the fact, I fear an indifferent person would only infer from it, that experience had made you acquainted with the benefits of complaining. Remember, Sir, that you have yourself confessed, that, *considering the critical situation of this country, the ministry are in the right to temporise with Spain*. This confession reduces you to an unfortunate dilemma. By renewing your solicitations, you must either mean to force your country into a war at a most unseasonable juncture; or, having no view or expectation of that kind, that you look for nothing but a private compensation to yourself.

(38)
As to me, it is by no means necessary that I should be exposed to the resentment of the worst and the most powerful men in this country, though I may be indifferent about yours. Though you would fight, there are others who would assassinate.

But after all, Sir, where is the injury? You assure me, that my logic is puerile and tinsel, that it carries not the least weight or conviction, that my premises are false and my conclusions absurd. If this be a just description of me, how is it possible for such a writer to disturb your peace of mind, or injure a character so well established as yours? Take care, Sir William, how you indulge this unruly temper, lest the world should suspect that conscience has some share in your resentments. You have more to fear from the treachery of your own passions, than from any malevolence of mine.

I believe, Sir, you will never know me. A considerable time must certainly elapse before we are personally acquainted. You need not however regret the delay, or suffer an apprehension that any length of time can restore you to the christian meekness of your temper, and disappoint your present indignation. If I understand your character, there is in your own breast a repository, in which your resentments may be safely laid up for future occasions, and preserved without the hazard of diminution. *The Odia in longum jaciens, quæ reconderet, auctaque promeret*, I thought had only belonged to the worst character of antiquity. The text is in Tacitus;—you know best where to look for the commentary.

J U N I U S.

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F I N I S.

